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Great-Britain.

LONDON, JULY 30—31, 1854.

THE WEEK AT HOME AND ABROAD.—Whenever our Ministers put forward a distinct proposition and intimate their determination to stand by it, they carry all before them. Perhaps they may have acquired a better insight into a truth so important to them by what happened this week in reference to the vote of credit. They came before both Houses of Parliament on Monday night, with no reserve except that which is essentially necessary to the proper conduct of their duties—at all events with no disguise—and stated the exact position of England and the English Government in the great war now pending. The avowed intention is not only to protect Turkey from the aggression of Russia, but to curb the aggressive power of Russia, and to place effectual barriers against her regaining such power. These are the conditions upon which alone peace will be accepted by Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet, which has been described as too anxious for peace. The precise terms, indeed, were not stated; and no one would pretend to canvass them now, unless he were dishonest or foolish. The terms cannot be settled by our wishes. Although the objects at which we aim can be fixed by our conviction and desires, the terms depend upon something else; they can only be conquered by our arms. We must make the positions in which we might dictate the terms we desire. It is not to be supposed that Russia will voluntarily recede from her position an inch more than she is compelled to recede, and she will consent to nothing which we have not acquired the means of forcing her to grant. Those Powers which have thus undertaken the contest, France and England, must be prepared to achieve the position in which they can command terms by their deeds. They may, indeed, accept any aid which is proffered, and they cannot despise the probable assistance of such a Power as Austria; but was it France and England which definitively espoused the fundamental principles of the war. As they have undertaken to do the work, their own safety as well as honour is now pledged to accomplishment. The work will not be done unless they be prepared to do it without waiting for Powers less pledged and less able than themselves. There had for some time been a rumour that the stability of ministers was to be tested in the House of Commons by some great action on the part of the Tory opposition, sustained probably by a combination from other parts of the House. A trial of strength had been talked of on the previous Monday, and was understood to have been postponed by the moral effect of Lord J. Russell's meeting in Downing-street. "An Individual," who occasionally permits himself to lead the Tory opposition, coyly dallied with signs of a combined resistance, waiting perhaps for a choice opportunity, the result of some casual dispute on the ministerial side, the accidental array of members in the House, or other piece of luck. By treating the vote of credit as a vote of confidence, however, ministers disturbed all these tactics. They forced the enemy to battle; and, thus forced into conflict, the enemy was fairly routed.

The project of an autumnal session offered no prospect of real utility, but only of fuss-making. The number of those who take a genuine interest in the conduct of foreign affairs is even now comparatively few; and, fortunately, the number of those who hope, by movements and speeches ad captandum within the House, to keep up their interest with noisy electioneering sympathizers out of doors, is also small. If Parliament had been sitting last autumn, Mr. Disraeli asserted, the affair of Sinope would not have occurred!—though how either House could have interfered to prevent that calamity, partly invited by the obstinate recklessness of the Turks themselves, it would puzzle even the author of a melodramatic play to understand. The sitting of Parliament did not prevent the cruel loss of the Tiger; nor is it possible that it could have any practical effect upon military and naval evolutions. The intervention of Parliament is not always without mischief. In the desire to perform the duty of extracting information, Members sometimes draw forth more than ought to be divulged. Although Adm. Berkeley's statement respecting the want of troops in the Baltic, and the impracticability of reducing Cronstadt with ships alone, will be news to nobody, there may be disadvantages in its authoritative confession. Lord J. Russell was perhaps urged beyond his intention in hinting at the policy of reducing Sebastopol. The more Parliament sits, the more we are liable to these contingencies; and while the course of Ministers continues to be generally as straightforward and intelligible as it is at present, there can be no advantage in detaining Members from the country for the mere object of keeping up a catechising, oftener mischievous than beneficial. We trust, that at the middle of next month we shall take leave of Parliament until its usual season for meeting in February.

Of the other subjects in Parliament, the only one which can command attention in the presence of so great a subject as the war, is the transit of the Oxford University Bill over its last critical stage. The Commons have agreed to the chief amendments of the Lords. The Peers had adopted real improvements made in the bill, and had restored the original text in some parts where the Opposition had impaired it; the beneficial influence of this judicious conduct extended to the other House, for the authority of the Peers induced some Members to reverse their votes, and hence two of the principal amendments by the Lords were sanctioned by conclusive majorities. That the measure is imperfect, cannot be denied; it is as imperfect as the first measure in improving a very complicated system like that of Oxford, without breaking it up, must necessarily be. But it is the first in a reform which may at no period of hopeless protraction render the Universities more thoroughly available for all the wants of the nation.

From either seat of war we have no reports this week of any fresh event, and we are quite content to be for a week without the means of reporting present progress. Impatient as we all are to have some great event at least once a week, we may remember that in all previous wars startling achievements did not come so frequently; and as time advances, we are able better to understand the progress already made in this contest. It has indeed been greater than the summary record of positive action on the field would indicate. We have had results which at the commencement we had not the means to calculate. We could not, for example, reckon upon that capacity for mixed aggressive and defensive warfare—that combination of daring and prudence—which has enabled Omer Pacha to obtain the superiority on the Danube; we had underrated the fighting power of the Turks, and could not presume such generalship amongst the resources of the Sultan. We are still unable to count with certainty upon the active alliance of Austria; but even her armed neutrality has already been amongst the elements of the combinations which have obliged Russia to hold back considerable bodies of troops from the Danube; and thus, negatively, Austria has already strengthened the relative power of Omer Pacha, and has served the purposes of the Alliance. Even if we cannot secure a much more active co-operation of Austria in the field, a continuance of these advantages would be too great a relief for our own resources to be despised. When France and England first definitively undertook to stand by Turkey, the most immediate concern was to secure the capital against conquest by Russia. We now find Turkey secured as far as the Danube. But important results of a campaign have been attained without so much as a blow struck by the Allied forces. Omer Pacha may be said to have cleared Lesser Wallachia without a battle. In like manner, the reduction of Silistria, which was supposed to be a simple question of military arithmetic, came to nothing before the force of circumstances combined against Russia. Again, the unhealthy province of the Dobrudscha was cleared from Russians without the necessity for entering it on the part of the Allies. The tract between the Danube and the Sereth appears equally to be in process of clearance without the necessity for advance. These things are done, and our commanders now stand, with ample powers, completely equipped forces, and a future before them.

The report from Spain for the week might consist of a repetition of that which we wrote last week, only with two important additions. We now know that the Queen has conferred, face to face, with the insurgents of Madrid, and has promised to consider their representations. In other words, the Royal Government has capitulated with the insurrection. Secondly, Espartero has issued an address, briefly devoting himself to the service of his country. Some question is raised as to the selection of Espartero for a popular leader, considering that his last acts in Spain constituted a great failure. He was defeated not so much by the strength of those opposed to him, as by some deficiency, some slowness, military or political, of his own. It was in fact a break-down. But the reason for the choice does not appear to us to be obscure. Spain has had more energetic men, cleverer men; but they have all yielded to the two great vices which distinguished ancient and modern Spain—the ancient vice of impracticable pride, the modern vice of self-seeking, which sacrifices everything to personal promotion. Spain in these days wants above all things a man who will think less of himself and more of his country; and of all public men in that country, there is none who stands so well in those respects as Espartero.—(SPECTATOR.)

THE BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF CRONSTADT.—No one whose opinion is worth a rush believes that Sir Charles Napier's hands are tied, for if Lord Aberdeen's ministry were capable of tying the admiral's hands, the admiral is certainly not the man to submit to have his hands tied. Sir Charles Napier has a reputation which he will not lose for such a base purpose as has been imagined, which the government on its part is utterly incapable of entertaining. If, then, Cronstadt is not attacked, the inference must be that one of the most enterprising and able officers in the service has his reasons for refraining, or for waiting opportunity; and we think Admiral Berkeley would have acted more judiciously if he had asked for confidence in Sir Charles Napier, and he would not have asked in vain, than by quoting opinions of inferior authority, resting on grounds the most fallacious. Admiral Chads climbs to the top of a lighthouse, and takes a survey of Cronstadt, which he forthwith, upon this bird's-eye view, pronounces of solid granite, an attack on which would be certain destruction according to Sir C. Napier. Well, certain destruction is common to almost any attack. There must be destruction where shot and shell are flying. Destruction was certain at Trafalgar and at Waterloo, and the only question was on which side would lie the heavier balance of destruction. The certain destruction following an attack on Cronstadt might after all be the certain destruction of the place; but that is not the meaning of the officer, who, having measured the solidity of the Cronstadt walls with the timbers of the combined fleets, found the latter inferior in strength in the proportion of stone to wood. It was a mass of solid granite. How does he know it was even granite, or if granite, that it was solid? Send the best engineer in England up to the top of the monument to survey Westminster bridge, and what respect would you have for his report if he pretended to make one upon such a view. And everything in Russia, except the hideous climate, looks like what it is not. As a man who knew the country well said, "Everything in Russia is a lie, it is a huge theatre with painted scenes, a gigantic device for illusion." Seeing is not believing in Russia, anymore than hearing, for the eye may be cheated as well as the ear, and the Czars have repeatedly been the dupes of shams so gross as sham structures. Cronstadt is no doubt as strong as it can be made, but if it has any extraordinary look of solidity, such as to strike an observer out of cannon-shot range on the top of a tower, it is to be suspected that such a show is false, that it is *postiche*, that the place is padded out, that it is an impostor of a fortress, or in one word, Russian, which expresses every mystification. Why are we to believe that Russian fortresses are better than Russian ships and Russian armies? They all loom mighty at a distance. A few months ago we were all told of the overwhelming armies collecting on the Danube. Omer Pasha did not climb to the top of a tower to look at them, and straight despair. He did not span the depth of their columns, and pronounce it certain destruction to come to close quarters with them. He proceeded in another fashion, pushed his army across the river in their face, and found what they were made of in the most practical of all ways, by feeling them with the point of his sword. But Omer Pasha is not troubled with too much art, and too much responsibility. What if I fail? is not his ruling question, but What if I succeed? and his forces are not too fine and costly for coarse work. As for us we are always in extremes. There were times when no account was made of walls against bulwarks, and certainly experience had borne out this opinion; but now, without any lesson the other way, we have come to a sudden conclusion that fleets cannot cope with stone walls, and say with the Chinese, "Stones are harder than eggs." And the change of opinion has come about with the use of steam which has so incalculably increased the advantages of ships. The wall has certainly some advantages over the bulwark, it is more impervious to shot, but on the other hand it cannot shift its position, nor take itself out of fire if circumstances make a retreat advisable. Casemated works impose mightily on the eye. You see them at Coblentz on the other side of the river, Ehrenbreitstein looking another Gibraltar, or a Cronstadt, or Sebastopol, and you observe that the gunners are in perfect security, and imagine the odds at which they would contend with the exposed crew of a ship, if a ship could be brought against it. But there is this little circumstance to be considered as a drawback, that after two or three rounds the chambers or galleries are so filled with smoke that the men can hardly breathe, and to see to lay their guns is utterly out of the question. With the advantage of steam power it is hard to imagine the circumstances in which a powerful fleet could be doomed to certain destruction even by an ill-judged attack on a strong fortress, unless indeed they should run the risk of stranding, like the Hecla and Arrogant in their much applauded affair, or the Tiger in her more unlucky one. The ships could always be drawn off upon finding they were overmatched. The fashions of opinion in these matters seem as capricious as other fashions. Time was when we were vainglorious about our wooden walls, but now the fanfaronnade is turned inside out, and in vulgar phrase we lustily cry stinking fish. We blow the enemy's trumpet for him, we extol his works, and lay ourselves down in despair at the foot of them. How this will comfort the Russian, says some one. Not a jot of it. He will not believe it. He will set it all down to perfidy. He will conceive the most dire misgivings of Cronstadt, and will be firmly persuaded that we regard the walls as made of sugar for a supper table. Russian interpretation makes Admiral Berkeley's speech quite safe, or its worst effect will be to put them on the most vigilant watch against immediate attack. Yet we wish that the speech had not been made, though we cannot concur in the unmeasured blame that has been cast upon it, for we cannot be insensible of the generous motive for the indiscretion, Admiral Berkeley having been a rival candidate for the command in the Baltic, and being eager to show that the officer who fills the post to which he aspired, has left nothing undone that could be attempted with the remotest prospect of success. And after all, putting Russia in prison is something, her fleets mocking their flags, confined in basins, doomed to rot in cold obstruction. But we see a question raised, which should be answered, whether this is the case in the Euxine, where it is alleged the blockade of Sebastopol is so imperfect that a steam-frigate has made its way, uninterrupted and unseen, from that port to Odessa. The want of quick vessels to act both as gun-boats and scouts, seems to be grievously felt in both seas, and apropos of that we must remark that Admiral Berkeley's challenge to Lord Dudley Stuart to show the Admiralty how to provide vessels carrying an efficient armament, and drawing only three feet water, was hardly ingenuous and fair. For though it may not be possible to construct vessels with the requisite armament, drawing only three feet, it is quite practicable to build them with a draught of five feet, as has been proved by Messrs. Scott Russell, who have furnished the Prussian Government with the Nix and Salamander fulfilling all the conditions specified.—(EXAMINER.)

THE NEW CAPE GOVERNOR.—Who is Sir George Grey, recently appointed Governor of the Cape of Good Hope? Is he one of the fortunate Greys, appointed for family favour; or is he one the very best man that could be selected for the government of that colony in these new days of its constitution? We may answer both questions in the negative. He is not one of the Greys of Howick, nor, we believe, is he at all related to them. He is not the best man that could have been chosen for the Cape in these early days of a constitution granted after rebellion. But his appointment is intelligible enough. Many years ago there was an expedition into the interior of Australia, in which Lieut. Grey and a brother officer were the principal actors; they showed great activity, skill, and courage in traversing that difficult country; but it so happened that Mr. Grey got the larger share of the credit. Some time after, South Australia was founded by intelligent colonists, upon sound principles, and the colony therefore became an object of jealousy to the Colonial-office. Having gone through a series of mismanagement by ill-selected or unlucky governors, the colony was greatly in want of a clever man, and Capt. Grey was appointed Governor. He managed the affairs of the settlement well; did *not* impress the colonists with a sense of his hospitality, but did impress the Colonial-office with a sense of his subserviency to bureaucratic suggestion, and his skill in softening the unpopularity of bureaucratic rule. The early history of New Zealand was, in its official part, even more disastrous than that of South Australia; and after a series of bad governors there also, clever Sir George Grey was appointed. He succeeded notably. The colonists were put to some trouble in their land relations by the totally figmentary nature of the native tenure; constantly baulked by the Colonial-office, and by a local government established in a remote corner of the island, they were, after repeated promises, expecting the constitution which Sir J. Pakington thought he had secured for them, and had sent to them through Sir G. Grey. They have discovered that before they could get hold of their complete self-government, they must undergo a probation. Sir George had succeeded in setting one part of the colonists against another, in cultivating the native tenure until it became a practical obstruction to the sale of land, and in delaying the constitution for fifteen months; having in the meanwhile destroyed a system of land sale disliked by the Colonial-office, and defeated every independent party, also disliked by the Colonial-office. Finally, having put every thing in suspense—land settlement, supreme court, enforcement of the constitution—he then came away to visit his native country, and to receive the approval of the Colonial-office; leaving his successor to arrange matters with the colonists and to pay his political bills. No man ever more thoroughly disappointed a colony, or rendered a colony more ridiculously impotent by setting one part of it against another; no man ever did better service in that way to the Colonial-office. The natives have been rather troublesome in the Cape. They have been in the habit of coming over the border and driving away the herds of the colonists. Under a particular set of treaties suggested by "humane" statesmen, the settlers were forbidden to take the law into their own hands, and the Blacks gaily carried on their game of picking up oxen and sheep upon Tom Tittler's ground—Tom being prevented from following them. This principally it was which caused the rebellion and re-emigration of the Anglo-Dutch across the border; those men whose independence has since been recognised. Subsequently Lord Grey resolved that the Cape, which had been guaranteed against the introduction of convicts, should, nevertheless, have them; all classes of the colony rebelled, and actually refused to hold intercourse with the government while the convicts remained off the coast, and thus they beat the government. Lord John promised them a constitution; when ministers afterwards evaded and delayed fulfilment of the promise, the Cape colonists again grew angry; and now they have their constitution. But it has cost this country some millions to put down, by concessions or military force, the successive outbreaks of the natives, the alineations of the Anglo-Dutch, and the open rebellion of the British. Now Sir George Grey is sent over with a special eye, we believe, to wheedling the colonists into some greater subserviency to the Colonial-office, and avowedly to manage the natives. This is an alarming admission; for if he should attempt to manage the natives as he has done the New Zealanders, by fostering the presumption and hopes of races only too ready to be presuming and sanguine, we should have more border wars, and more rebellions, Dutch and British. Or if Sir George is too clever a man to tamper with colonists that rebel, perhaps other colonies may learn, from that new form of an old lesson, how to treat a troublesome Governor.—(LEADER.)

CAPTAIN J. A. BUTLER.—Deeply as the death of Captain Butler may be lamented, his fate is far from being one from which a soldier would recoil. If his life has been cut short, it has been full; if his parents have to mourn his loss, they have not to mourn that his promise has been unfulfilled. A longer life might have added to the list of his actions, but it could not have stamped his character more strongly. To encounter death is the very business of the soldier, and every man who sets forth with a sword by his side must be distinctly prepared to walk straight up to his fate, not only without flinching, but without hesitation or regret. How many are there, however, who have to incur that chance of the soldier's life without realizing the rewards of the sacrifice? how many who perish nameless? While still a very young volunteer, Captain Butler had the opportunity of proving, as Lord Hardinge says, his valour, his skill, "his prudence and firmness in council." Commanding in a semi-barbarian force, acting as volunteer assistant to the illustrious soldier of fortune who leads the Turks, he was mainly instrumental in prolonging the defence of Silistria even to the discomfiture of a great Russian army. "Sa mémoire ne périra pas dans l'armée Ottomane," says Omer Pacha. It will indeed not perish in the history of the Continent, which is the history of the world; for the siege of Silistria will always stand conspicuous as the point at which the power of Russia received its check; and to a great extent it may be said that Butler administered that check. The Turks, the army of his own country, his Government, his countrymen, all conspire to proclaim his merit. Like Bellot, like Eldred Pottinger, he is among those men whom death selects at an early age to promote at once and for ever amongst the most distinguished servants of their country and of mankind.—(SPECTATOR.)

THE COURTS-MARTIAL AT WINDSOR.—The two companion Courts-martial at Windsor, on Lieut. Perry and Lieut. Greer, furnish disclosures which are extremely painful. Although they are separate cases, they are in fact the two sides of one case—the two different versions of a quarrel; and although there are discrepancies in the two versions, there are certain conclusions to be derived from both jointly. What may be the decision upon that joint case, it is not for civilians to anticipate, especially as the proceedings reported in the newspapers are essentially imperfect. The most connected account is derived from one side; but it is without material contradiction, and it is so far confirmed by marked silences on the other side. Too much is disclosed to permit the withholding of more. The public necessarily has a strong feeling, that if the two officers implicated ought not to have changed places in the first trial, at all events the balance of misconduct was not on the side of him who was the defendant. It may be admitted at once, that Mr. Perry's conduct in submitting to the treatment which he received is inconsistent with the general idea of an officer as well as of a gentleman. Allowance must be made for a young man without advisers, and to whom retirement from the Army would probably be ruin in life; but if we take a very strict view of moral virtue, or even of the duty which a gentleman owes to himself in ordinary society, we must admit that no prudential considerations ought to have justified a young man of right feeling in submitting to the personal indignities to which, by his own account, he was subjected—indignities going far beyond debasement, and involving an outrage to decency. And we must further admit, that the kind of attack with which at last he put a stop to the violence of Lieut. Greer was not the redress to which a model gentleman would resort. But, unless Mr. Perry's statement be entirely discredited, there are others whose conduct merits a much harsher judgment. *He* has some right to plead extenuating circumstances—the brutal attack of a man stronger than himself, and the combination of many others to torment; but these circumstances afford no excuse for his tormentors. We pass by the open presence of the female witness in the barracks, although it is an occurrence which speaks ill for the good taste of the officers or the correctness of the command; we allude only to the most flagrant examples of disorder. The conduct of Lieut. Greer is far from being the worst incident; the concurrence of many officers to share in an act of cowardice like the compulsion of Mr. Perry to perform the sword-exercise naked, speaks worse for the character of all who could willingly take part in such a scene. According to the statement, it appears that Perry submitted to be the victim; that Greer has an appetite for outrageous bullying; but how are we to estimate the moral feeling of the passive bystanders? Mr. Perry stated that he had complained to his commanding-officer without redress. This was denied, and evidence was produced to rebut the statement. The point was not examined sufficiently for us to determine in what degree either side was right; but there is no evidence to disprove the statement that such disorders existed in the regiment. How far does this state of moral feeling exist in the army? There are occasional incidents in other regiments which suggest the question whether all is right there; and this case, coupled with the sufferance shown to it, imparts a new gravity and extension to such doubts. It affects the character of the British officer, and we must remember that to the British officer at present is intrusted the safety of the British army. We do not forget, indeed, that the judgment provoked by these transactions is not the only one that the British officer merits. Other men have written their own characters in strong autographic inscription upon the history of their country, the juniors as well as seniors: from Wellingtons, whose genius added the most glorious of victories to the national list, and whose firm hand wrote the materials for the history of those victories—from Napiers, who can fight and write, down to the subalterns—we have many men of the highest mark; men like Burnes, who could master state affairs as well as regimental business; like Eldred Pottinger, who, though a subaltern, could sustain the outposts of an empire; like Nott, who could rise from a humble position to the highest ranks in the army by sheer merit, and show that the humblest Englishman can be as much a gentleman as the Pagets or the Fitzroys who have hereditary standing among our chivalry. But the question is, to what extent the bad spirit which exists so extensively and is tolerated so monstrously in the Forty-sixth Regiment coexists with the better? It is difficult to find parallels for such conduct in civil society at the present day, but we must go back to the depraved court of Charles II and its gallants. The only excuse, it might be supposed, for those who partake in the scenes described by Mr. Perry, is that they have not the wit and accomplishments which ought to have checked Rochester or Sedley. Between what classes of officers or what classes of regiments can the distinctions be drawn? The subject is one so serious that it ought not to pass with newspaper censure alone. The question we ask merits a distinct and formal answer. We admit, that at the present moment an open investigation might have consequences too serious for it to be risked; but if there be not an open investigation, one of a confidential character should be instituted. And it is quite possible. It is not for us to point out the mode, but undoubtedly the Commander-in-chief can procure such reports upon the state of every regiment in the service as to ascertain how far it may be necessary to weed the army of those men who do not add to its strength, but are a stain, a disgrace, and a disease.—(SPECTATOR.)

HEALTH OF THE TROOPS AT ALADYN.—A correspondent writes to the *Post*, July 14:

Diarrhœa and bowel complaints are increasing rather alarmingly as the weather grows more sultry. The Guards' Brigade alone have no less than 148 men sick in hospital, and the number increases at the rate of about 20 daily. These, it is to be observed, are cases of really serious illness, and do not include the numerous cases treated by the surgeons, and not sent to hospital. There are also several complaints of intermittent fever. All the regiments are more or less affected; but from some cause, which may peradventure be attributed to their proverbial soundness and hardihood of constitution, the men of the Highland Brigade have hitherto enjoyed a comparative exemption. They certainly have several sick, but by not any means their full proportion relatively to other corps. This is the more curious, inasmuch as the fine fellows composing this brigade have been by no means the most careful in the observance of the sanitary maxims which have been set forth for the benefit of the army. The French troops likewise enjoy a comparative immunity from illness—partly it may be presumed, in consequence of a large proportion of them having gone through the process of being "acclimated" to tropical campaigning in Africa, and partly from their having had the good fortune of arriving before us, and taking possession of higher and more healthy ground than that on which the British camps are pitched. The rank luxuriance of the vegetation, perennially springing up and decaying is, combined with the fogs and vapours arising from the lakes and marshes, a fruitful propagator of malaria. It is unpleasant to have too add to those discouraging particulars respecting the health of the British army that the supply of "extra comforts" has again failed. No potatoes, no rice, no sugar, no tea—scarcely anything for the soldier save the tough flavourless ration. Here, only ten miles from Varna, where there is store of these commodities, the difficulties of transit present seemingly insurmountable obstacles to their arrival. The commissariat department is doing its best, but is fairly in a "fix" for the means of efficient transport.—(W. News.)

LORD CARDIGAN'S "RECONNAISSANCE."—A letter from the camp near Varna, dated July 14, contains the following:—

Lord Cardigan, who has returned from his long and toilsome exploring trip to the Danube, has brought back a budget of information, which will probably be found eminently useful in the future operations of the war. No less than 18 horses were "knocked up" by the fatigues of the journey. His lordship's description of the state of the country is about the least inviting that can be conceived—everywhere barrenness, ruin, and desolation—provisions of all kinds consumed or drawn away, whole districts depopulated, and everywhere bearing the marks of the recent presence of ruthless warfare. The noble lord had to "rough it" in the open air for 17 successive nights with his party of dashing Hussars, who speak warmly of his assiduous attention to their health and comfort, and of the cordial, soldierly spirit in which he shared every privation which they had to endure. Amongst the many accidents which befel the party, they happened one day to meet, in the midst of the desert, a company of the wild Asiatic irregulars—somewhat of the Bashi-Bazouk cast—whose appearance at Constantinople, under a female leader, occasioned so vivid a sensation two or three months since. After it had been mutually ascertained that both parties were on the same side, some conversation took place through interpreters, and the veteran Amazon was good enough to impart to Lord Cardigan sundry pieces of advice on military and professional topics, the said counsel, it is reported, being of so trite and tedious a quality as to have considerably taxed his lordship's courtesy and gallantry.—(Atlas.)

WHY WE CAN'T GET AT SEBASTOPOL.—The *Essex Herald* gives the following extract from a letter recently received by his brother at Black Notley, from Charles Cook, ship's corporal, on board her Majesty's ship London, forming one of the Black Sea fleet:—

After Odessa, we went to Sebastopol, in hopes that the Russian fleet would come out to us, but they would not, and we kept sailing before the place for three weeks, but they would not attempt to come out; so now we must wait for the troops to engage it by land and set it on fire, and we shall engage by sea at the same time, and fall it must, with their fleet destroyed. Now, I will tell you the reason why we cannot get at them without the army—*it is just like leaving the highroad and turning down Panfield lane*, because we have to go down this lane for about three miles before we can get to their fleet, and only one ship can go through at a time. Now, here is the danger all the way, in having to go through where there is nothing but guns to pass; there are about 1,200, one above the other, and in trying this passage, the ships would be destroyed and sunk in going through, but by the army engaging them on shore and storming the place (which is not strongly fortified by land), they will engage our army, we shall pass by their forts, and then Sebastopol will fall.—(Examiner.)

The following is from a private letter, dated Varna, July 13:—

I cannot help remarking how first rate the French system is. They put up the tri-colour at once, name all the streets with neatly painted boards: and their commissariat is excellent. They have their own bakers and butchers, while with us all is running here and there to see who will bake the bread, or where the meat is to be had. The few commissariat officers are slaves, and it is only a wonder we get what we do. Horses can be had here for three pounds ten shillings, and, as yet, forage is plentiful. The sailors of the Tiger do not speak so well of their treatment as report did. They say only four of them could go out at a time, and then always with four soldiers attending them.—(Britannia.)

EGYGPT.—THE LATE RULER.—A new Viceroy reigns in Egypt; Abbas Pacha is dead: Said Pacha succeeds. Of the deceased the *Daily News* says:—

Egypt experienced very hard usage at the hands of its now deceased ruler. He fulfilled the most unfavourable rumours that were afloat in his grandfather's time as to the fate of his people and their commerce under his rule. Amidst the extreme difficulty experienced by everybody, from the late Pacha himself to the passing traveller, of ascertaining the real condition of Egypt, a few facts stand out indubitable. We fear, also, that there is no doubt that where Abbas Pacha's eye rested, and where his hand was laid, the decline has been most obvious, as it is, of course, most recent. There are memorials of his methods, however, which are not very recent, and which show what became of production under his care. That he would give security of life and property to his people nobody anticipated. It was more than could be expected in Egypt from any but a very extraordinary man. There were not many who supposed he would pay more respect to internal improvements than decorum to the memory of his grandfather and uncle required. But that he would foster the European alliances, which had done so much for the country, and countenance the foreign trade of his ports, and adhere to his convention of free trade, was confidently expected. At first it appeared as if he meant to do so; and his intercourses with the English and French consuls-general—friendly and agreeable men both—were frequent and familiar. It soon appeared, however, that this was merely in pursuit of pleasure. He liked exchanges of handsome presents with foreign potentates. He liked helping Mr. Murray to send us the hippopotamus; he liked offering challenges for races on the sands under the Pyramids: he liked to buy English bull-dogs of great price and greater ugliness; and he liked ordering and obtaining the most splendid of yachts from an English shipbuilder's yard. But he could never be got to attend to business. He was fitful in his moods; apt to shut himself up when an audience was extremely wanted; apt to run off, and forbid anybody to follow him, when steamers were entering the port, with despatches requiring instant and earnest attention. Of all difficult places to follow a man to on business, perhaps Mount Sinai is the most so: and to Mount Sinai, therefore, was the Pacha most fond of going—having a villa there, and trying to be a *Sardanapalus* in a small secondary, vulgar kind of way. His grand eccentricity seemed to be his hatred of Alexandria. Alexandria is the *Cinderella* of his family of cities; and there is no other so enlightened, or, though not very beautiful, so worthy of his favour. But he could not bear trouble, and therefore he could not bear trade; and therefore he could not bear Alexandria. He stripped the people—now by purchase, nominal or real, and now by confiscation; and all the corn was in his own granaries, that he could intercept on its way to the merchants' stores. What the merchants got hold of last year he forbade them to sell; and up to the time of his death he was commissioning his own officials to buy up the total produce of Egypt for himself alone. He would not allow any European trader any chance against him. The acts of a ruler like this touch us—not only our merchants at Alexandria, but our working classes at home. We may have no business to meddle with an Egyptian Pacha's exclusive relations with his own people; but when Abbas Pacha came into the market in royal state, to override commerce and treaties with his royal equipage; when he stepped in between the producers, merchants, and consumers, to break off their transactions, it became time to inquire, in all diplomatic moderation, what he meant, and to inquire also whether he would be viceroy or corn-dealer—this being an age of the world when no man can be allowed to use the prerogative of the one function to grasp the profits of the other in the very teeth of a free-trade convention. But death has stopped him in mid career, and has so protected our Egyptian commerce, and saved us from the freaks of a new kind of Merchant Prince. May his successor be a wiser and a better man.—(Leader.)

AGAIN THE FRUITS OF BAD EXAMPLE.—We have unhappily been true prophets as to the consequences of the encouragement of the rash affair of the Arrogant and Hecla at Ecknaes. Almost immediately following was the ill-arranged and disastrous attempt upon Gamla Karleby, and now we have to record the death of Captain Parker in an attack upon a stockade at the Sulina mouth. All these affairs involved much risk without any adequate object, and the last was especially marked by foolhardiness. First, there was a false security, the presence of the enemy not being even suspected; and when they discovered themselves by opening fire, an attack was determined on and made forthwith without any knowledge of the force to be encountered, or any steps to ascertain it, or to be prepared with a reserve or with reinforcements if the boats should be overmatched. The *Times* says:—

"This is the third death among our naval officers, owing purely to their own recklessness of danger, which has occurred since this war began. Captain Foote was drowned because he would pull out against a heavy sea in an insufficient boat; Captain Giffard ran ashore and lost ship and life in chase of a paltry prize; and now Captain Parker has thrown his life away in a swamp of the Danube by an act of sheer folly. Surely all this is very lamentable. Three noble-hearted gallant men and capable officers dead, and in such a way!"

Had this just view been taken of the first evil example, that of the lauded affair of the Hecla and Arrogant, the probability is that several brave lives would have been saved, and that the Czar would not have had so many English prisoners to parade. We do not blame the care that is taken of our line-of-battle ships, but it would be well to apply Franklin's rule of economy to our fleets, and to make sure that if we take care of the little the great will take care of themselves. At present the rule seems to be that where much is to be gained nothing is to be risked, but where nothing is to be gained much is to be risked—much in proportion to the force concerned.—(Examiner.)

POLITICAL GOSSIP OF THE "PRESS."—Our readers will recollect that we last week inserted a contradiction from the *Globe* to a statement by the *Press* of the retirement of Count Walewski. This week the *Press* repeats its statements with the following additions:—

We have now to announce that the retirement of another diplomatic character from our Court may speedily be expected. His Excellency Admiral Virgin, minister of the King of Sweden, is about to conclude his too short residence among us.—The Austrian government has positively declared that its occupation of the Principalities is incompatible with the presence either of a Turkish force, or of the allied armies, in those provinces. Thus it recurs to its project of *armed mediation*.—We have reason to believe that, in consequence of urgent intelligence, of a peculiar nature, received at the Admiralty, Admiral Stopford will be despatched immediately to the Black Sea, and has, perhaps, already departed for that quarter.—(Atlas.)

ADMIRAL BERKELEY AND SIR C. NAPIER.—With respect to the partial quotations made by Admiral Berkeley from private letters of Sir Charles Napier, our correspondent is strongly of opinion that the commander in the Baltic has not been treated fairly by Admiral Berkeley. Our correspondent states that Sir Charles Napier did say, and thinks, that Cronstadt is unassailable by ships; but he also said that it could be attacked with boats of light draught of water, and guns of long range. If such, as our correspondent states, be the case, it materially alters the complexion of the letter quoted by Admiral Berkeley. Our correspondent further calls attention to the circumstance that four months ago, or thereabouts, Mr. Scott Russell offered to turn out six boats of the description indicated *in three months* from the date of his offer. That offer was refused, and yet the Admiralty have sent Mr. Scott Russell to purchase from Prussia two boats of the very same description, built by Mr. Russell himself. Mr. Russell returned, says our correspondent, on the 25th inst., having succeeded in his mission of purchasing the boats he had built. In justice to an absent Admiral, we have thought it right that these facts should be brought under public notice.—(Press.)

A petition is in course of signature at Newcastle-on-Tyne, begging the House of Commons to pass a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet in consequence of its efforts to substitute Austrian for Russian influence in Turkey.—(Atlas.)

The Irish Militia, to be organised next year, will consist of thirty-eight regiments, amounting to 21,000 rank and file. At present there are fourteen adjutancies vacant, and the total staffs of all grades is only 170 on paper. It is anticipated that there will be some difficulty in raising this force, in consequence of the great emigration, "the comparative abundance and increased prices of labouring employment," and the general enlistment for the regular army now in progress.—(Spectator.)

THE LATE FAILURES IN NEW YORK.—On this subject the New York correspondent of the *Chronicle* contributes the following interesting communication:—

The late astounding stock frauds, extending, so far as known, to at least three millions of dollars, have not only shaken public confidence and credit to a degree unprecedented for many years, but they have produced deep and anxious inquiry as to the latent but rapidly growing causes of such deplorable evils, as well as solemn, and it is to be hoped not unprofitable, reflections upon the alarming fashions and signs of the times, especially in this city of New York. Whither has flown the republican simplicity of bygone years, accompanied as it was by pure sincerity and simple truth? Alas! it is known no more. But, in its stead, we have extravagance, luxury, pride, pomp, and an aping of aristocracy. Nay, start not. Believe me when I say that aristocracy exists in a republic (I mean social aristocracy), especially in the larger cities. Why, here in New York, as well as in other cities I could name, many merchants, brokers, and particularly contractors and speculators, who reside in palaces decorated with the thickest and richest Turkey carpets, sofas, and chaises-longues, worth hundreds of dollars each—lakes of mirror in gorgeous frames adorning the walls—chandeliers in gold and caystal, with their thousand